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Our empirical study provides the first insights of executive staffing practice patterns in 
foreign-owned multinational company (MNC) subsidiaries based in Japan. We explore 
determinants for parent country nationals (PCN) as top managing directors and – new in 
the International Human Resource Management (IHRM) literature – also the ratio of 
PCN found on the board (Ratio) and examine under which conditions they are prevalent 
in the subsidiaries. We sampled the full range of 3,241 foreign companies in Japan. For 
the PCN/Ratio, several of our hypotheses were relevant for the PCN and were tested to be 
positive.  
In regard to the ownership ratio of the subsidiaries, the PCN/Ratio is highly significant 
to 1%, supporting the theory that also for Japan high ownership matters when it comes to 
sending one’s “own” people to the subsidiary abroad. In contrast to studies for other 
countries, however, the size of the subsidiary does not matter for Japan, at least when 
measured (like usually done) by the number of employees. Only if we measure size by 
capital does the PCN/Ratio prevalence become significant.  
The PCN/Ratio also becomes highly significant (by 1%) in countries with a high 
Power Distance and a high Uncertainty Avoidance. PCN sending behavior seems to be 
somehow a country-specific phenomenon. We, furthermore, show that it matters whether 
companies settle down in one of the two big centers in Japan (Kanto and Kansai), which 
cultural circumstances for PCN tend to be more similar than in other areas of Japan. In 
Kanto and Kansai there are statistically significant more PCN and, therefore, a higher 
PCN/Ratio than in other Japanese areas.  
In regard to MNCs, we show that smaller sized MNCs have a lower prevalence of PCN 
as their top managing director. These findings are in contrast to the International Human 
Resource Management literature. We put MNCs into two groups and show that MNCs 
with under 5000 employees have a lower prevalence of PCN as top managing directors 
(on average 28%). At the same time however, the PCN to the whole board (Ratio) is 
higher in these smaller MNCs (up to 10%). In other words, bigger companies seem to 
rely on their PCN as their top managing director in Japan. In contrast to this, in smaller 
companies, Japanese senior managers prevail as the top managing directors (HCN), 
although our research suggests that there are more PCN sent to the board of the bigger 
MNCs. Finally, we produce evidence that US subsidiaries in Japan have the lowest 
PCN/Ratio, with the PCN only counting for 22%, and the Ratio at 28%. In stark contrast, 
Asian countries have the highest PCN/Ratio in our sample, with Korea leading with PCN 
of 81% and a Ratio of 82%. 
 
 
Keywords: International Human Resource Management (IHRM); executive staffing 
practice patterns; Power Distance; Uncertainty Avoidance 
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Introduction 
 
The first authors who linked Human Resource Management policy to strategy issues were 
Edstroem and Galbraith (1977). Since then, the question of whether or not an expatriate 
should run a subsidiary has been a topic of International Human Resource Management 
(IHRM) research for nearly 30 years (Tung, 1982; Kobrin, 1988; Boyacigiller, 1990; 
Sohn, 1994; Banai, 1995; Wang et al., 1998; Downes and Thomas, 2000). IHRM 
examines the question of whether to send a parent country national (PCN) or to find a top 
manager in the host country, where the subsidiary is actually located (i.e. a host country 
national (HCN)). There is a variety of literature comparing PCN advantages over HCN 
(Edstroem and Galbraith, 1977; Hamill, 1989; Hendry, 1994; Negandhi, 1987; Root, 
1986; Banai, 1992; Borg and Harzing, 1995).  
However, the IHRM literature faces several shortcomings. Many studies in this area 
focus only on the PCN as the top managing director. Two exceptions in this field are the 
studies done by Boyacigiller (1990) and Tang and Maloney (2006). They investigated the 
ratio of expatriates to all employees in the subsidiaries. There are also multi-country 
research designs, where Japanese HRM – when included in all in the samples – normally 
compare IHRM staffing policies to other countries. Kopp, who contributed empirical 
research in 1994 also analysed staffing placement practices in three areas: Europe, Japan 
and the United States. Another multi-country study was done by Harzing in 1999 and 
2001 who noted that: “It can also be concluded, that while Japanese MNCs continue to 
rely strongly on expatriates, European MNCs have localized their subsidiary management 
in the past two decades” (2001, 26). In these studies, however, data for a single country is 
only available to a limited degree. Furthermore, many studies examine policies but do not 
examine the actual staffing practices in place. There is therefore, a paucity of empirical 
research on international staffing (for an exception see Harzing, 1999, 2001; Thompson 
and Keating, 2004; Tang and Maloney, 2006). Finally, research undertaken in this field 
includes often times only small sample sizes, as shown by Tung’s basic research in this 
field (1982) which consisted of only 144 companies. Other studies in this field also had a 
small sample size. Boyacigiller (1990) conducted research with only 84 cases, Kopp 
(1994) with 81 and Peterson et al., (1996) with only 29 cases. Tang and Maloney’s (2006) 
research utilised a sample of only 284 companies. 
Another string of research is country specific, even though it is only partly connected 
to Japan. However, if Japan is integrated into the research, it is not about foreign 
subsidiaries in Japan. As far as the authors are aware, IHRM studies related to Japan and 
to Japanese investment usually examine Japanese firms’ conduct in overseas markets. 
That is, they investigate Japanese HRM in other countries (Belderbos and Heijltjes, 2005; 
Nakamura, 2005; Delios and Bjoerkman, 2000; Kranias, 2000; Belderbos, 1997; Rodgers 
and Wong, 1996; Belderbos and Sleuwaegen, 1996; Bartlett and Yoshihara, 1988; 
Beamish and Inkpen, 1998). 
In our research on executive staffing practice patterns in foreign MNC subsidiaries 
located in Japan, we investigated the opposite viewpoint to what has been frequently 
presented in the literature until now. The present paper seeks to address this gap in the 
literature by testing, under carefully controlled conditions, several hypotheses on staffing 
practice patterns in the Japanese context (Attachment 1). This article provides the first 
empirical evidence concerning executive staffing practice patterns in foreign MNC   3
subsidiaries based in Japan. We not only investigated the issue of PCN as top managing 
directors but also the ratio of PCN to all members in the board room (later referred to 
PCN/Ratio). In contrast to Boyacigiller (1990) and Tang and Maloney (2006) who used a 
ratio of PCN to all employees company wide, we focus on the ratio in the boardroom of 
the subsidiary to the ratio of PCN to all board members.  
In the next section, we describe our theoretical concept, followed briefly by an 
examination of Japanese HRM developments. In the proceeding section, we develop our 
hypotheses. After bringing together both our methodology and our results we will briefly 
examine MNCs and their country origin. Finally, we will present a conclusion that draws 
together the key findings presented in this paper.  
 
The Theoretical concept 
 
Early groundbreaking research on executive staffing policies was initially undertaken by 
Edstroem and Galbraith (1977). They developed a concept that gave concrete reasons 
why headquarters should send expatriates to a subsidiary located in another country 
(Borg, 1988). They found three motives and distinguished them as such: to fill positions, 
to allow management development, and to foster organizational development. In 
addressing the first motive, to fill positions, means that there is no country national 
available to fill this position. This first motive mainly concerns the lack of technical 
expertise amongst the people found in the host country, thus meaning that the MNC has 
to send its own managers to the subsidiaries.
1  
The second motive, centred on the idea of management development, means that the 
MNC would still prefer to send an expatriate even if qualified host country managers are 
available in the country where the subsidiary is located. The idea behind this idea is that 
such a policy brings experience to the expatriate manager, thus meaning that promising 
employees might be sent out as expatriates to subsidiaries which are located in other 
countries in order to receive valuable experience. After repatriation, they will be ready 
for bigger tasks worldwide, or at least to become a kind of bridge maker between the 
overseas subsidiary and the headquarters of the MNC.  
Finally, the third motive for transferring managers to subsidiaries in foreign countries, 
so Edstroem and Galbraith state, is less related to the individual development of 
managers but rather to the overall development of the organization, so-called 
organizational development. Organizational development occurs when the MNC 
headquarters sends expatriates abroad to coordinating and/or controlling the business 
activities of the overseas subsidiary. Even if enough qualified HC-managers are available 
(the first motive) and there is no pressing need to develop managers (the second motive), 
the reasons underpinning sending a manager to an overseas subsidiary can frequently be 
based on this third motive.   
We base our hypotheses on these three motives, as developed by Edstroem and 
Galbraith. Furthermore, in some cases where appropriate, we also integrate three other 
theories, such as transaction cost theory, agency theory and also use the resource based 
view. In the next section of the paper, we present the Japanese context.   
 
Japan and human resources policies 
   4
In this section we want to present recent HR developments in Japan. Basically, we argue 
that the HRM system has dramatically changed and for foreign investors there are now 
new opportunities in regard to finding suitable senior Japanese managers.  
Traditionally, the Japanese HRM system was based on the so called “three pillars”, 
namely long-term employment, a seniority-based wage system and enterprise based 
unions (Sano, 1995). This system has been based partly on cultural roots and was mostly 
developed in post-war Japan (Gordon, 2001; Mackerras, 1992: 373-376). Derivations 
from cultural roots however, are still visible in expressions like mura shakai (village 
society) or shudan shugi (group-orientation). In postwar Japan, the management pattern 
has been frequently identified as paternalistic where the employees relate to each other in 
similar fashion to a family. It can be said that up until now it was considered difficult to 
find appropriate senior Japanese managers.  
Recently however, Japan has seen change in this area and HRM strategies have been 
modified to a large extent (Benson and Debroux, 1998; Takeuchi, 2005).  Through the 
long economic recession in the 1990s and increasing global competition, there is high 
pressure on Japanese organizations to modify their policies and strategies in regard to 
becoming more open and more flexible in the HRM market. The government, especially 
the Ministry of Finance (MOF) is supporting a more flexible HR market, which can be 
achieved through both internal and an external policies. The internal policy is called 
Shukko, which describes a method by which companies are able to send their own 
employees without difficulty to other subsidiaries. Especially the bigger companies who 
rely on flexible HR policies welcome this initiative. Another external method is called 
Hakken, where employees are staffed by a third company. These third company based 
employees are employed within a flexible system and can easily be let go during times of 
economic difficulties. Normally contracts of Hakken employees cover only short time 
stays in the company.  
Other changes are visible in the performance based and skill /knowledge based pay 
system, which is steadily becoming the dominant system in contrast to the previous 
seniority based pay system (Watanabe, 2000: 327). In recent years, Japanese managers 
are more flexible in changing companies than they were before the 1990s (Pascha, 2005). 
Overall therefore, the Japanese HRM system is changing dramatically, while also 
offering significant possibilities for foreign investors. Underlying this trend is the 
prevalence and importance of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Japan, widely 
acknowledged as the key driver behind these changes in HRM in Japan. One of the key 
ways nowadays that foreign companies can benefit from this more open HR market in 
Japan is that it is now easier to find high quality senior Japanese managers (HCN). In the 
following we provide some hypotheses to test executive staffing practice patterns in 




The purpose of this study is to find determinants for executive staffing practice patterns 
in foreign MNC subsidiaries based in Japan. Consequently, this paper analyzes 
determinants of PCN/Ratio in two ways. First, PCN appointments as top managing 
directors are investigated, and in the second step, the board ratio of PCN to all board 
members is investigated. We used the full range of 3241 foreign companies based in   5
Japan. To date, Third country nationals (TCN) have not been included in our study due to 





In the general part, we test five hypotheses. First, we investigate the size of the subsidiary 
and examine whether the PCN prevalence differs. In regard to transaction cost theory, the 
larger the subsidiary the higher the investment risk for the headquarters. According to 
Edstroem and Galbraith, organizational development becomes increasingly important 
when the size of the subsidiary increases. Therefore, the bigger the subsidiaries the higher 
the investment is; thus meaning that the MNC should be more interested in controlling 
the subsidiary by sending a PCN to it (Boyacigiller, 1990; Harzing, 2001; Hamill, 1989). 
Our hypothesis is:  
 
Hypothesis 1.1 PCN/Ratio subsidiary managers will be more prevalent in larger 
subsidiaries   
 
In our second hypothesis we investigated the issue of ownership ratio. In regard to 
Edstroem and Galbraith (1977), a higher ownership ratio leads to an organizational 
development motive for sending a PCN to the subsidiary; certainly transaction cost theory 
supports this idea. The higher the ownership share by the MNC in the subsidiary, the 
higher the financial risk becomes for the MNC. In this regard, PCN who are sent to Japan 
with an expatriate package receive extra benefits, like free housing, a free car etc. thus 
making them more expensive than Japanese top managers. Regarding transaction cost 
theory, an expatriate sent to Japan is assumed to be more expensive than a Japanese top 
manager and, therefore, will only be sent when the share of ownership is high. In other 
words, if a foreign MNC only has a low level of ownership share in the subsidiary, it 
should be less important to take the high risk and the high costs of sending a PCN to this 
subsidiary. Therefore, we are assuming that the PCN/Ratio will increase and become 
more prevalent as the ownership ratio itself increases. Our hypothesis therefore is: 
 
Hypothesis 1.2 The PCN/Ratio will increase in line with a higher ownership share 
by the MNC. 
 
Our third hypothesis is concerned with the experience and knowledge of the subsidiary. 
Underpinning the motive of position filling is often the notion that PCN are more 
prevalent in younger subsidiaries. It can also be argued from the resource-based view, 
that young enterprises in the market can hardly attract Japanese top managers. One of the 
reasons could be that Japanese top managers, in cases where they plan to work for a 
foreign enterprise, are more attracted by well known companies. According to the 
resource-based view, PCN can serve as an initial liaison by the headquarters to the 
subsidiary. Harzing confirms that: “…transfer for communication reasons is likely to be 
more important for recently established subsidiaries, since the communication network 
with headquarters has to be build up from scratch” (2001, 10). Alternatively, the extent of 
prior knowledge could be one of the decisive factors for placing a HCN in the overseas   6
subsidiary (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000). The resource-based view explicitly suggests 
that as the MNC gets more experienced in the host country, there is a good chance that 
PCN prevalence decreases. Younger subsidiaries could also use a PCN sent from 
headquarters to implement fundamental guidelines formulated at the headquarters of the 
parent company ((Harzing, 1999, 2001; Boyacigiller, 1990; Hamill 1989). Therefore, our 
hypothesis is:  
 
Hypothesis 1.3 The PCN/Ratio is more prevalent in younger subsidiaries.  
 
 
Our fourth hypothesis concerns industry specific characteristics. Industry related factors 
have been investigated for other countries conceptually (Hamill, 1989) and also 
empirically (Thompson and Keating, 2004; Harzing, 1999). For Japan, there should be 
industry specific differences visible, therefore. In regard to organizational development, 
industries should differ in their HR-structure. Thus, resource-based theory suggests that a 
multinational firm is likely to rely more on the host country nationals when there is a 
greater need to obtain local knowledge. For example, there is high foreign investment in 
some industries like banking, where local knowledge is generally not as important as in 
other industries. From the agency’s viewpoint, it should be easier to achieve a smooth 
alignment (especially for banks), when there is a high prevalence of PCN employees 
within the foreign-based subsidiary of the MNC bank. Our hypothesis therefore is:  
 
Hypothesis 1.4 The PCN/Ratio will be more prevalent in bank subsidiaries than in 
other industries.  
 
In regard to business contacts generated by the subsidiary with other countries, some 
researchers suggest that host country oriented subsidiaries have usually less necessity to 
receive PCN employees as they are unable to help in the local business market 
(Belderbos and Heijltjes 2005). According to agency theory, the choice for an assignment 
of a PCN is a trade-off between the cost of monitoring the behaviour of the PCN to the 
risk of having an unknown HCN. Therefore, in local oriented subsidiaries, the need to 
have PCN should be relatively low. According to the aforementioned management 
development motive by Edstroem and Galbraith (1977), PCN numbers should increase in 
line with export /import activities of the Japanese subsidiary. We investigated this 
question in regard to export and import activities of the subsidiaries, to establish whether 
PCN in export /import oriented subsidiaries are more likely to prevail. Therefore, we 
tested this hypothesis: 
 





In the second part of our hypotheses on subsidiaries, we researched significant cultural 
aspects. The international business research literature has extensively used Hofstede’s 
work on national character measurement (Hofstede, 1980, 1991). In Hofstede’s empirical   7
investigation spanning sixty-six countries and 88,000 subjects, he developed indices for 
defining national culture using four criteria: Power Distance (autocratic versus 
democratic management style), Uncertainty Avoidance Index (tolerance of uncertainty), 
Individuality (individualism versus collectivism), and Masculinity versus Femininity 
(degree of masculine assertiveness). Based on this seminal work, later research was 
carried out to analyze cultural distances between headquarters (firm’s home country) and 
subsidiaries in host countries (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Erramilli, 1991, 1993; Agrawal, 
1994).  
We developed our aforementioned hypotheses using two of the four criteria: Power 
Distance (PD) and Uncertainty Avoidance (UA). Power Distance can be best described as 
the “…perception of the superior’s style of decision-making and of colleagues’ fear to 
disagree with superiors, and with the type of decision-making which subordinates prefer 
in their boss” (Hofstede, 1980, 92). The other criterion, the Uncertainty Avoidance Index, 
(UAI) is used by Kogut and Singh (1988) to explain entry choice into foreign countries. 
This index is low in societies where individuals accept uncertainty easier. We use this 
UAI developed by Hofstede too, to test whether countries with higher uncertainty 
avoidance more often send a PCN to their subsidiary to Japan. Our two hypotheses 
therefore are: 
 
Hypothesis 2.1 Countries with higher Power Distance (PD) leads to an increase 
in the PCN/Ratio 
 
Hypothesis 2.2 Countries with higher Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) leads to an 
increase in the PCN/Ratio 
 
The third hypothesis using the idea of cultural distance covers several aspects in Japan. 
Cultural distance in this sense refers to the degree of difference that exists between a 
cultural climate a PCN finds in a Japanese city to an international cultural climate (to at 
least in other English speaking parts in the world). Higher cultural distance is associated 
with greater uncertainty. Managers in the heavily populated regions of Kanto (Tokyo, 
Yokohama etc.) and Kansai (Osaka, Kobe, Kyoto etc.) might not face big cultural 
difficulties as they can work within a large expatriate community. According to our data, 
almost all foreign subsidiaries are based in these two centres, 3083 to only 148 based in 
other areas. Interestingly, from our full sample of 3241 companies, there are 2838 foreign 
firms headquartered in the Kanto area (in or around Tokyo), while the Kansai region only 
plays host to 245. However, many foreign companies have their main subsidiary located 
in Tokyo and a second subsidiary located in Kansai (not shown in our data, however). 
Consequently, in big cities, like Tokyo or Osaka there are more Japanese business men 
who can speak English in contrast to local areas where only very few foreigners reside 
and even fewer foreign-owned businesses are present.  
 
Hypothesis 2.3 The PCN/Ratio will be more prevalent in Kanto and Kansai as the 
cultural distance is smaller then in other areas of Japan.  
 
 
Methodology and research model   8
 
It is difficult to obtain enough valid information via surveys or interviews for this 
research; therefore, this data was gathered mostly from secondary sources (mainly 
through the Gaishikei-kigyo soran, 2003 digital data base). All information on executive 
staffing practice patterns used in this research targeted the top management level, 
including board members. In this sense, we concentrated on two areas. First, we 
investigated top managing directors who lead subsidiaries (what has been done, at least 
for other countries). Second, we investigated the ratio of parent country nationals as 
managers (Ratio) in the subsidiary board (an area not covered in the literature to date).  
The nationalities of the managers were classified by the managers’ names as either PCN 
or HCN. Even if it is not 100% assured that the classification is always correct, previous 
testing using a smaller sample on German executives located in Japan-based subsidiaries 
obtained promising results (Bebenroth and Pascha, 2006).  
Moreover, in our data of 3241 foreign subsidiaries in Japan, there were only 55 
publicly listed foreign companies out of a total of 3189 foreign companies in Japan. The 
size of the companies (subsidiaries and MNC) is measured by the number of employees 
(e.g. see Harzing, 1999, 2001) and also by capital. We obtained the cultural index of 
Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance for several countries from the Website: 
http://www.geert-hofstede.com. 
In the statistical analysis part we worked with two different models. For our research 
on senior managing directors we took binary data, PCN versus HCN, and used a logit 
regression model. This model relates to the probability of having a PCN to a set of 
explanatory variables X. 
 
   
Prob (PCN=1) = Exp (α+βX) / (1+exp (α+βX)) 
   
 
In our investigation of the Ratio we used the following multiple regression model:  
 
Ratio=Ќ0 +Ќ1*Ln(Employee) +Ќ2*Ln(Capital )+Ќ3*Ownership +Ќ4*Age +Ќ





We present our regression results in table 1. On the left hand side, our results are 
presented using the logit model for explaining the decision to assign a PCN as a senior 
managing director. On the right hand side our results are presented using the simple 






Table 1 Logit regression and multiple regression results of PCN/Ratio   9

Variables  PCN                
Ќ            Significance 
Ratio 
Ќ               Significance 
General part 
 Size of subsidiaries 
(Ln no. of employees) 
Size of subsidiaries 
(Ln capital) 
Ownership ratio 
Age of subsidiary 
Industry Dummy 
-.003            .926 
 
.071             .021
** 
 
.034             .000
*** 
.003             .489 
-.368             .208 
-4.86E-03       .402 
 
1.53E-02       .002
*** 
 
4.91E-03       .000
*** 
8.66E-04       .107 







Area difference  
Kanto to others 
Area difference  
Kansai to others 
.027            .000
*** 
 




.680            .016
** 
 
.764            .018
** 
4.68E-03        .000
*** 
 




6.40E-02        .048
** 
 





.127ʢCox & Snellʣ 
2683 
.132 
* = 10% significance,   ** = 5% significance,  *** = 1% significance 
 
 
Overall the empirical model performs well. We have explanation power with a pseudo-R
2  
for our logit-model of 12.7% and for our multiple regression model of 13.2%. 
Our first hypothesis, that PCN will be more prevalent in larger subsidiaries, is only 
partly confirmed, just measured by the size of capital but not in the number of employees 
(like other studies relied on, e.g. Harzing, 1999, 2001). Measured by capital, PCN 
assignment as top managing director was significant to 10% and the PCN-ratio was very 
significant at 1%.  
The ownership share showed a significant positive result (1%) and supports our 
hypothesis pertaining to the PCN senior managing directors as well as for the Ratio. That 
means there is a clearly visible increase of PCN/Ratio in line with a higher ownership 
share. In our third hypothesis – testing for a correlation between the age of the subsidiary 
and a PCN/Ratio – we could not find any significance. 
Our fourth hypothesis centred on the banking industry, did not show any significance 
regarding banks in our regression models. In an additional step, therefore, we tested for 
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.000














As can be seen in the table 2 above, PCN as senior managing directors in the financial 
industry are (with 51%) more prevalent than in other industries on average (with 30%). 
This holds for a significance of 1%.  
Finally, our fifths hypothesis in the general part of this research deals with the 




Table 3 Import and Export  
 
Variables PCN 
Ќ                Significance
Ratio 
Ќ                   Significance 
Import 
Export 
.009                .000
*** 
.002                .746 
2.37E-03          .000
*** 
1.47E-03          .059
* 
Number                         647 





When investigating the correlation between the import/export ratio of the subsidiary and 
the PCN/Ratio, our research turned up some interesting results. PCN as top managing 
directors and their Ratio were highly significant in the import relationship (under 1%). 
This means that import related subsidiaries rely more frequently on PCN than what is 
suggested in the literature (Belderbos and Heijltjes, 2005). 
For our hypotheses regarding culture, certain specific factors are in line with what we 
expected. We received support for a positive and significant correlation between 
PCN/Ratio and Power Distance Index and also for a positive and significant Uncertainty 
Avoidance Index (both with 1% significance). This means that countries with a high 
power distance and high uncertainty avoidance send statistically significant more PCN as 
senior managing directors to Japan, and that there is a higher Rate of PCN in their 
subsidiaries. This confirms our hypotheses on cultural aspects concerning foreign MNC 
subsidiaries in Japan.  
Also, our results supported a correlation between culturally specific factors in Japan. 
Almost all foreign subsidiaries are based in the Kanto region, with more than 12-fold 
based in this central area in comparison to other regions. However, many branch offices 
are located in the Kansai region. The statistical significance (with 5%) supports our 
hypothesis that there is higher prevalence of PCN top managing directors in these two 
populated regions than in other rural areas in Japan (Attachment 2).  
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A Closer look at MNC size and country orientation 
 
In this additional section on MNC size, we have only used a sample of 1223 companies. 
For the same reason as with Import/Export, we did not include MNC size in our main 
model (Table 1) for avoiding bias. Therefore, in this additional section we investigated 
the PCN/Ratio to the size of the MNC separately, testing with ANOVA-Analysis and 
using the t-test. In this additional part, we tested PCN/Ratio prevalence to the MNC firm 
size.  
We tested our hypothesis for the size of the MNC in respect to the PCN/Ratio 
(Thompson and Keating, 2004). In accordance to Perlmutter (1969), internationalization 
strategies take several steps. The basic idea is that the size of MNC develops over time. 
At the beginning, the headquarters is still small and has, therefore, an ethnocentric 
strategy where decisions are done and controlled by the headquarters, subsidiary staffing 
policies are therefore closely aligned with the interests of the MNC headquarters. In this 
case PCN would be sent to subsidiaries. As the company becomes bigger in size, the 
MNC would turn to a more polycentric strategy, where HCN wield substantial influence 
in the subsidiaries. In the last stage, the MNC becomes a global player and undertakes a 
more geocentric strategy. With a geocentric strategy, the company appoints the best 
people it can find regardless of nationality or location. Our hypothesis assumed this 
would take a U-curve shape. In the regression part, however, we did not find any 
significance in regard to MNC size and prevalence of PCN/Ratio neither with the logit 
model nor with regression model (not reported in this paper). The PCN/Ratio was 
therefore, tested in groups using correlation analysis. 
 In table 4 we split the MNC into four groups. The smallest group contained fewer than 
4,999 employees. The second group had more than 5,000 employees, while the third 
group had more than 20,000 and the fourth group more than 70,000 employees.  
 
Table 4 Correlation of PCN/Ratio to MNC size  
 









1         ʙ       4999 
5000   ʙ     19999 
20000 ʙ     69999 




























Table 4 shows that PCN as top managing directors in companies with fewer than 4,999 
employees (our smallest group) as well as in our biggest MNC group with more than 
70,000 employees have prevalence on average 28%. In contrast to this, companies 
ranging in size from 5,000 to 20,000 employees have on average a PCN prevalence of 
39%, while companies with 20,000 to 69,999 employees have on average a PCN 
prevalence of 36%. The Ratio provides very similar results for all MNCs with fewer than 
7,000 employees (42%-47% range). Bigger MNCs, such as the key global corporate 
players, surprisingly have a Ratio of only 30%.     12
To investigate whether there is a significant correlation between the different sizes of 
firms and the PCN as the top managing director, we used ANOVA analysis. 
 
 
Table 5        ANOVA Analysis of PCN and MNC firm size 
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As can be seen in the table above, there is significance between the mean of group 1 
and group 2, which is 1%. That means, there is a significant correlation to 1% between 
PCN as the top managing director and the size of the smallest companies of our sample 
(fewer than 4,999 employees) and the next bigger MNC (with fewer than 19,999 
employees). The same situation applies to group 4 and 2 which also has a 1% significant 
correlation. The significance between group 1 and 3 is still 5%. 
Next, we established only two groups with a separation line of 5,000 employees, where 
we integrated the bigger MNC (group 2, 3 and 4) into one single group. Here again, it 
appears there is a differences between these groups as, shown in the table 6 below. 
 
Table 6        Correlation of PCN/Ratio to MNC size  
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As can be seen in the table 6, smaller companies with fewer than 4,999 employees 
have a lower PCN but a higher Ratio (45%). In other words, smaller MNCs have only a 
prevalence of 28% PCN as top managing directors, however, they seem to compensate   13
for this through undertaking active staffing practice patterns strategy creating a higher 
Ratio of PCN in the boardroom of the subsidiary In contrast, he bigger MNCs with over 
5,000 employees rely more often on a PCN as top managing director (34%), but have 
only a Ratio of 39%. By using the t-test we found a 5% significance between our smaller 
MNCs with fewer than 4,999 employees and the bigger companies with more than 5,000 
employees.  
In the second step of this research we analysed country specific elements. Interestingly, 
US companies had the lowest PCN/Ratio prevalence for all countries with subsidiaries in 
Japan, which was only 27%, the Ratio was even lower with only 22% on average. In 
contrast to this, Korea had the highest PCN/Ratio in their MNC subsidiaries in Japan with 
82% for PCN and a Ratio of 81% (see attachment 3).  
We then placed all foreign MNC subsidiaries into three groups, from English speaking 
countries, European and Asian as La Porta et al. (1999) did. It was clearly visible that 
MNCs from English speaking countries have on average the lowest prevalence of 
PCN/Ratio, whereas the PCN was 24% and the Ratio was only 28%. Asian MNCs 
counted for the highest PCN/Ratio, whereas the PCN was 68% and the Ratio was 69%. 
European firms were found somewhere in the middle with 38% of PCN in senior 
management, having a Ratio of 40%.  
 
Table 7    Correlation of PCN/Ratio to Country of origin 
 



























The PCN/Ratio is also in line with power distance and uncertainty avoidance. That is to 
say, the higher the power distance and the uncertainty avoidance factors the higher the 
prevalence of PCN/Ratio, with a high significance (1%) for all variables (see attachment 
4: ANOVA-Analysis).  
Finally, our study’s limitations were clearly in line with most other investigations that 
have based their findings primarily on desk research. That is, a degree of uncertainty 
existed in ascertaining whether senior managers were really in fact Japanese nationals or 
not.  
Another limitation of our data source was that only the top management position, seen as 
the president, was unambiguously visible in its position. Therefore, whether this person 
really holds the most powerful position in the firm is in reality open to debate.  Some 
anecdotal evidence in Japan seems to suggest that it is not the first person in the hierarchy 
but others in senior management who hold the real power. This could be an interesting 
scenario, especially if there was only one foreign president and he could not understand 
the Japanese language or the local culture (this stands even in cities like Tokyo). In this 
respect, we could not obtain information pertaining to who actually held the position of 
Chief Financial Officer (CFO). It is possible therefore, that a foreigner in this position 
could more or less control the subsidiary, even if the president were a Japanese national.   14
In spite of these limitations however, our study is the first comprehensive research on the 




We investigated several key determinants for executive staffing practice patterns in 
foreign MNC subsidiaries based in Japan. In this regard, we analysed the prevalence of 
PCN as senior managing directors and the ratio of PCN to all members in the boardroom.  
As a result, we found statistical significance for PCN/Ratio in cases of high ownership 
share by the MNC. The significance of the ownership share was supported probably 
through the fact, that Japan is a very expensive country. Therefore, in cases where a PCN 
is transferred to Japan, the headquarters of the MNC might have been influenced by an 
organizational development motive. This means that the MNCs’ headquarters might send 
PCN for control reasons to their Japan based subsidiaries. In contrast to other countries in 
Asia where it is less expensive to live, there might also be the motive of managing 
development. In this case, in relatively inexpensive countries expatriates can undergo 
professional development and are therefore groomed for an international career, but this 
example does not obviously apply to Japan. 
We could not find significance for the correlation between the age of the subsidiaries 
and PCN/Ratio. In contrast to what is argued in the IHRM literature, the PCN/Ratio does 
not prevail in younger foreign MNC subsidiaries based in Japan. In the banking industry 
we could not obtain any significance in our regression. However, in a separate correlation 
test we showed that PCN as top managing directors prevail on average with 51%, which 
stands in stark contrast to all the other industries with an average of 30%. In the area of 
Import/Export, we also found high significance for import related subsidiaries (to 1%). In 
regard to import /export, we support Edstroem and Galbraith’s first motive, to fill 
positions. The reason is not clear but it might be because of the cultural distance, 
meaning that there are no suitably trained local staff available. Also the second motive, 
management development could be applicable at stronger import based subsidiaries, as 
the subsidiary will benefit in cases where managers from the MNC are trained at the 
subsidiary.  
The PCN/Ratio regressed to cultural specific aspects measured by Power Distance 
Index and Uncertainty Avoidance Index, showing significance to 1%. MNC from 
countries with high power distance and high uncertainty avoidance have a higher 
prevalence of PCN/Ratio in their subsidiaries in Japan. Also in our other hypothesis about 
cultural-specific aspects in Japan, we can show that there is a statistically significant 
higher PCN/Ratio prevalence in the two big areas in Japan, namely the Kanto and Kansai 
regions. 
In regard to our additional MNC related research, using a separate model and a sample 
of 1,223 MNCs, we reached the conclusion that we are unable to support the theory that 
in bigger companies a higher PCN/Ratio prevails. Like Thompson and Keating in their 
study of Ireland, we could not find any significance between the size of the MNC and the 
prevalence of PCN/Ratio. But when we divided companies based on their sizes into two 
groups, we were able to show that there is higher prevalence of PCN as senior managing 
directors in companies with over 5,000 employees. In contrast to this, in smaller 
companies under 5,000 employees, we found a higher Ratio. This means that bigger   15
companies more frequently send PCN as senior managing directors, whereas smaller 
companies might rely on a Japanese head, but will more often send a board manager to 
the subsidiary (i.e. a higher Ratio).  
Finally, we investigated country specific aspects for all major investors in Japan and 
their ownership share in the subsidiary. North American MNCs had, surprisingly, the 
lowest Ratio (with 22%) as well as the lowest score worldwide for PCN as their top 
managing directors (27%). Additionally, when we placed all the countries into three 
groups, we found that English speaking countries had the lowest PCN/Ratio prevalence 
(with 24% and 28% respectively), and Asian countries had the highest (with 68% and 
69% respectively), while European countries were in the middle (with 38% and 40% 
respectively).  By using ANOVA-Analysis, we showed that these findings are in line 
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Parent country aspects: 
MNC size  
Ownership  
Likelihood of PCN/Ratio 
prevalence in top management 
positions in foreign owned 
MNC subsidiaries in Japan 
Cultural Aspects in Japan: 
 
Kanto, Kansai, others 
Cultural aspects between 
Japan and parent country: 
Power Distance 
Uncertainty Avoidance   19
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Attachment 3   Cultural specific characteristic  
 
Country Frequency  PDI  UAI  PCN  Ratio 
USA  1514 40  46 22%  27% 
UK  243 35  35  28%  32% 
Italy  59 50 75  46% 45% 
Australia  28 36 51  39% 43% 
Holland  76 38 53  30% 31% 
Canada  47 39 48  38% 36% 
Swiss  172 34  58  36%  38% 
Sweden  57 31 29  46% 40% 
German  337 35  65  31%  36% 
France  231 68  86  48%  48% 
Korean  83 60 85  81% 82% 
Hong Kong  60 68 29  28% 33% 
Taiwan  47 58 69  51% 52% 
China  54 80 30  70% 69% 
Denmark  30 18 23  33% 37% 
Singapore  18 74 8  50% 50% 
Finland  27 33 59  44% 48% 
Other  158 49  66  35%  35% 
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1 It is to mention that their study focused on third world countries where first world 
MNCs invest in. 
2  We did not include Import/Export variables in our main logit/multiple regression 
models (Table 1), as we could get data only from 647 subsidiaries. Therefore, we avoided 
bias influence by Import/Export variables to our main models.  